University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
FMHI Publications

Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute
(FMHI)

1-1-1988

Aftermath of a disaster: Psychological response to
the Russelville, Arkansas Mass Murder
Elizabeth Mary Smith
Carol S. North

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/fmhi_pub
Part of the Mental and Social Health Commons
Scholar Commons Citation
Smith, Elizabeth Mary and North, Carol S., "Aftermath of a disaster: Psychological response to the Russelville, Arkansas Mass Murder"
(1988). FMHI Publications. Paper 19.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/fmhi_pub/19

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute (FMHI) at Scholar Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in FMHI Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.

HAZARD HOUSE COPY

~ ~~" MA\\. O-t ~ ~SA~~¥": ~!r-"-\~ic.'
~e~to"Jc. +0 ~ ~&A''''''\\\c.. Ao...LIts-.s

t"A CS

fv\u.~ckr"

Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center
Campus Box 482
University of Colorado
Boulder, Colorado 80309-0482

AFTERMATH OF A DISASTER: PSYCHOLOGICAL RESPONSE TO THE
RUSSELVILLE ARKANSAS MASS MURDER
Elizabeth Smith
Carol North
1988

Quick Response Research Report #24

This pUblication is part of the Natural Hazards
Research & Applications Information Center's ongoing
QUick Response Research Report Series.
http://www.colorado.edu/hazards

Institute of Behavioral Science #6 • (303) 492·6818

FINAL FIELD REPORT -- RUSSELLVILLE, ARKANSAS
Over the Christmas holiday of 1987, a 47 year old man murdered fourteen
members of his family in his rural home just outside of Dover, Arkansas (pop.
circa 7,000).
property.

He buried most of the bodies in shallow graves on his

His actions not yet discovered, a few days later, on December 28,

he appeared in the quiet little nearby town of Russellville, Arkansas (pop.
circa 15,000).

There, the gunman went on a shooting spree that lasted 35

minutes, as he methodically visited four local businesses and shot individuals
he was said to hold a grudge against (along with others who happened to be in
his way).

Before giving himself up to authorities, he succeeded in fatally

wounding two people and leaving four other injured victims in his wake.

Media

accounts held this event to be one of the biggest mass murders in modern
American history.
The gunman was a man said to be a heavy drinker and wife abuser.

It was

also discovered that he had a long, unstable job history; he had also
previously fled from another state to escape charges relating to sexual abuse
of his own young daughter.

He was a man who was said to be increasingly

unhappy prior to the shootings; he had quit his job a few days before,
disgruntled by wages and work hours, and he had then unsuccessfully attempted
to obtain unemployment benefits.

Co-workers said that he was a quiet man who

didn't get along well with others and isolated himself, but they had no idea
that he was capable of such carnage.
When the gunman appeared at the various businesses and began shooting,
eyewitnesses were initially so surprised that they could not even believe it
was real.

In the quiet town of Russellville in a county that prohibits the

use of alcohol, events such as this are practically an anachronism.

Many

witnesses stated that they initially believed it was a joke, and not until
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they saw the Ilblood pumping out ll and people falling down dead did the reality
of the situation hit them.
The gunman skipped from one business to the next, shooting those on his
list, driving to the next location and taking care of business there.
each location he changed hats.

Between

One woman he killed was a woman he had worked

with at one of the businesses, and she had resisted sexual advances he had
made toward her, then complained to her boss; the gunman also shot and
seriously wounded the boss who now worked at a different location.
Russellville, Arkansas was not prepared for a disaster of this magnitude.
All three of the cityls police vehicles were called to the scene of the
shootings.

Each time police headed toward the source of an emergency call

reporting a gunman and wounded individuals, new calls in other locations kept
coming in before the officers could even arrive at locations of other calls,
and the police found themselves in a chase around town.

It was not until the

gunman had finished shooting everyone on his list (and two other individuals
who were in the wrong place at the wrong time) that he was apprehended, when
he laid down his guns and asked employees of the last business to call
authorities.
The town was left in shock.

Individuals reported continued fear and

jumpiness even after the gunman was locked away in another county.
there seemed no rhyme or reason for the violence or its pattern.
moved to piece together information to help explain the event.

Initially
Authorities

Media

personnel from across the nation converged on Russellville, splashing stories
and reports across television screens and front pages of newspapers across the
country.

Witnesses interviewed by the media were often angered when they

later read or saw what they believed to be absolute misinformation.
complained of overt sensationalism.

Many

Initially anxious to speak with the media
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and share their stories, witnesses quickly developed distrust and resentment
of anyone remotely resembling media, and refused further comment.

It was into

this atmosphere that we moved to begin the task of our research.
METHODS
We first learned of the mass murders through media reports.

A phone call

to a local reporter a few days after the event yielded information that there
were perhaps two dozen witnesses, and that the townspeople were a friendly
bunch who had been very cooperative in sharing their information with him.

He

stated that people were easy to reach via listings in the local telephone
directory and via their workplaces, and he urged us to come there as soon as
possible and start phoning witnesses, offering his assistance if we needed.
The version of the Diagnostic Interview Schedule/Disaster Supplement
(DIS/OS) used in studying the Indianapolis-Ramada Inn jet crash disaster was
modified slightly to make it pertain specifically to the Russellville
situation.

Every effort was made to have questions on the Russellville

interview parallel those on the Indianapolis interview, in order to allow
precise comparison during data analysis.
Upon arriving in Russellville, the research team began by visiting each
of the four businesses involved in the shootings, speaking to the business
owners to explain the study and invite them to participate.

Two of the four

owners refused to participate or to permit us to speak to any of their
employees or give us names of any clients .or customers who were present.

Thus

without this 'initial contact there was no way of knowing exactly how many
individuals were involved there or.who they were.

Subjects were often very

. wary initially, appearing distrustful and vigilant until they were assured of
who we were and what our purpose was.
or wrongdoers posing as researchers.

At first we were mistaken for reporters
Once we had gained their trust, owners
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of the other two businesses gave us a warm reception and permitted us to
approach their employees to invite them to participate in the study.
Individuals who were not available for interview at work were located
either through newspaper reports or by their fellow co-workers.
Sample
Within the universe of all employees at the two participating businesses,
15 individuals had been present at the shootings.
participate.

Eleven of the 15 agreed to

As was done in the Indianapols-Ramada Inn jet crash study, it

was elected to also interview employees who were absent from the scene of the
disaster when it happened, to provide a comparison group.
in this "off-site " group, seven agreed to participate.

Of ten individuals

Overall, 18

individuals out of the possible 25 participated in the study, giving an
overall refusal rate of 28% (27% of eyewitnesses and 30% of those not
present).
Most persons interviewed said they agreed to participate because they
wanted to be of help in a research effort which they thought might benefit
others who would go through a similar disaster in the future.

Other

individuals said they felt that they needed to talk about their experience or
that they saw it was an opportunity to obtain help personally.
Among the "on-site" individuals and business owners who refused, several
indicated that it was too upsetting to talk about the disaster experience.
Others expressed concern that in spite of all reassurances about confidentiality, a leak of information might somehow impair judicial proceedings and
result in the gunman not getting the conviction or sentence they felt he
deserved.

These individuals indicated that they would be more willing to talk

after the trial.

One refuser indicated that he believed we were reporters in

disguise; another stated that he didn't want to be "studied" or be a part of
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any research.

Refusers in the "off-site" group were often heavily involved in

overwhelming tasks in the wake of the disaster and could not further extend
themselves to help the research.

One subject was simply too busy with routine

demands of his work schedule.
Instruments
Subjects were interviewed about their psychiatric and social status using
a modified version of the Diagnostic Interview Schedule/Disaster Supplement
(DIS/OS) (Robins and Smith 1983). This interview was designed for the ECA
Hazards study funded by NIMH (Smith et al. 1986) and has been used by
investigators in several recent disaster studies.

It elicits information

about the disaster experience and the individuals' perceptions of the event,
use of formal and informal support systems, behavioral response to the
traumatic event, and 15 DSM-III diagnoses selected for their potential
relevance to the disaster experience.
diagnostic categories were included:

In this study only the following
post-traumatic stress disorder,

depression, somatization disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, panic
disorder, phobic disorders, antisocial personality disorder (adult component),
alcohol abuse/dependence, and drug abuse/dependence.
For each disorder that was ascertained to have occurred, age of onset and
age at last symptom were obtained, thus providing lifetime as well as current
psychiatric status.

Onset and recency for each positive symptom of the

relevant diagnoses were also obtained.

Thus information was available as to

the presence or absence of each symptom during the interval between the
disaster and the interview, and prior to the disaster.
The disaster interview also contained a number of other measures that
might be sensitive to changes in mental health.

The~e

included use of health

services and psychoactive drugs, health and disability.status, role function,
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and social support.

In addition to these questions. all of which were part of

the ECA interview. the disaster section explored the disaster experience and
its

m~aning

for the respondents.

All participants were asked to evaluate news

coverage of the disaster. on whom they blamed the disaster. and whether other
stressful life events had occurred in the last year.
SUbjects were also asked to complete two self-administered forms:

the

Impact of Events Scale (Horowitz et ale 1979). a 15-item questionnaire which
measures current subjective distress related to experiencing a stressful life
event; and the Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire (Cloninger 1986).
The majority of interviews were conducted in-person and were completed at
four to six weeks after the disaster event.

For various reasons. a few

interviews could not be scheduled in person and were completed by telephone.
Interviews were conducted by one of the authors (CSN) and two fourth-year
psychiatry residents.

All subjects were offered $10.00 for participating.

The interview took on average approximately two hours to administer.
Data Analysis
The "on- site" group of 11 subjects was defined as those employees who
were present at the scene of the murders.

The "off-site l' group was composed

of employees of the same businesses who were not present at work at the time
of the disaster.
Because of the limited size of the study sample. tests of significance
were not performed.

The results will be presented in a descriptive fashion.

RESULTS
Demographic information
The sample was 55% female and 100% Caucasian. with a mean age of 37.6
years (Table 1).

The off-site group was over-represented by females and was

older (mean. age. 44.3 years) than the on-site group (33.4 years).

The
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majority of subjects were in the 25-44 year age range.

Two-thirds of the

sample was married, and this ratio held for both subgroups.
completed high school or had obtained a G.E.D.

Most subjects had

Almost three-quarters of the

sample had attended college, and overall mean years of education was 13.5.
The on-site group was better-educated, reflected in their higher rates of high
school/ G.E.D. completion (100% compared to 91% off-site) and college
attendance (81% compared to 47% off-site), as well as greater mean years of
education (13.7 vs. 13.1 off-site).
Subjective distress and attribution of blame
Respondents were asked how upset they had been after the shootings, and
how much they felt they had been harmed.

Perceived degree of upset (Table 2)

was scored high (livery upset ll ) by almost three-quarters of the respondents,
especially those in the on-site group.

The majority of subjects denied that

the disaster had caused them a great deal of harm; not one of the off-site
sUbjects endorsed this idea.

Over half felt that they had completely

recovered, and 100% of those in the off-site group reported full recovery.
All interviewed survivors reported that they had at least partially recovered.
-Respondents were

al~o

asked if they thought that the victims or any other

individuals, industries, or government agencies were in any way to blame.
Respondents universally blamed the gunman.

One subject also felt that the

level of security at work was insufficient, and one subject placed additional
blame on law authorities in another state for not having apprehended the
gunman on past felony charges.
Psychiatric Impact
As shown in Table 3, about one-fifth of the subjects met DSM-III criteria
for at least one of four psychiatric diagnoses [including post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), alcohol abuse/dependence, major depression, and
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generalized anxiety disorder] following the disaster.

Half of these cases

occurred in subjects who had no prior history of the same diagnosis, i.e.,
incident cases.

Although on-site subjects had about twice the prevalence of

post-disaster diagnoses compared to off-site sUbjects, examination of only
incident cases does not show this same pattern -- in fact, off-site subjects
had a higher proportion of new-onset disorders.

Thus, appearance of new post-

disaster psychiatric disorders did not appear to vary with degree of exposure
to the disaster.
Symptoms of PTSD were among the most common of symptoms reported (Table
4).

Three-fifths of the sample acknowledged experiencing one or more symptoms

of PTSD, averaging 2.11 symptoms per subject.

PTSD symptoms did appear in a

dose-response relationship to degree of exposure to the disaster with on-site
victims averaging .3.00 symptoms per sUbject, compared to less than one symptom
per sUbject in the off-site group.

Four-fifths of on-site subjects reported

having one or more PTSD symptoms, compared to iess than one-third of the offsite group.
The two PTSD symptoms most frequently endorsed were jumpiness and
insomnia, by

~lmost

half the subjects for each.

Almost three-quarters of the

on-site group described feeling jumpy or easily startled after the disaster,
while none of the off-site sUbjects endorsed this symptom.

Other dose-related

symptoms were difficulty concentrating, insomnia, and recurrent dreams/
intrusive recollections.

Over one-third of the sample reported experiencing

recurrent dreams/intrusive recollections.

No subjects reported survivor

guilt.
Almost one out of five on-site victims (two sUbjects) met DSM-III
criteria for PTSD after the disaster, while no off-site sUbjects met criteria
(Table 5).

These two cases were both incident cases (Table 6).

One on-site
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victim met criteria for a past PTSD episode, which did not recur after the
disaster.
Although the interview was not designed to make DSM-IIIR diagnoses,
reported symptoms were fit as closely as possible into DSM-IIIR criteria for
PTSD and the data were re-analyzed.

No sUbjects met DSM-IIIR criteria for

PTSD, largely because of a general lack of endorsement of symptoms of loss of
interest, detachment from others, numbness, and amnesia.

Although it is

recognized that the DSM-III/DSM-IIIR comparison is not perfect due to the
different methodologies employed to make the diagnoses, it at least allows a
rough comparison of the two sets of PTSD criteria in the same population.
There were no post-disaster cases of alcohol abuse/dependence in either
on-site or off-site subjects (Table 6), although two on-site subjects admitted
to symptoms consistent with alcohol abuse (without dependence) in the past.
It is possible that the location of the town of Russellville in the IIBible
belt ll and in a dry county may have produced sufficient cultural influence to
limit the development of alcohol disorders in this population.
Two on-site subjects and one off-site subject were suffering from
depression following the disaster (Table 6); two of these were incident cases
(one in each sUbgroup).
There were no cases of generalized anxiety disorder following the
disaster (Table 6) despite a pre-disaster history of three cases in the onsite group and one in the off-site group.
All sUbjects reported feeling at least some subjective degree of upset
after the disaster (Table 7).

Tendency to meet criteria for a psychiatric

diagnosis did not correlate with how upset subjects reported they felt.
Despite the frequent admission of livery upset ll feelings, about three-quarters.
denied much harm to themselves by the disaster, and tendency to have a post-
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disaster psychiatric diagnosis did not correlate with degree of perceived
harm.

Perceived degree of recovery did, however, predict the likelihood of

meeting criteria for a psychiatric diagnosis. and those who felt fully
recovered were less likely to have developed a disorder.
failure to recover at least in part.

No sUbjects reported

One off-site subject who reported full

recovery did meet criteria for a post-disaster diagnosis of depression
(incident case).
Predictors of post-disaster psychiatric status.

Prior to the shootings,

almost three-fourths of the on-site subjects had experienced a diagnosable
psychiatric disaster, while only one off-site subject (14%) had, a 50% rate
overall (not shown).

Major depression and generalized anxiety disorder

contributed equally to comprise the majority of these pre-disaster cases
(three cases each).

It is possible that disaster-related symptoms similar to

those contributing to these two diagnoses sparked memories of depression and
anxious symptoms experienced in the past. symptoms not recalled by off-site
victims.
When the analysis was expanded to include post-disaster disorders in
calculation of rates of lifetime diagnosis, the overall percentage of
respondents with one or more lifetime diagnoses rose to 61% overall (82% of
on-site and 29% of off-site sUbjects).

The 50% pre-disaster and 61% lifetime

prevalence rates of psychiatric disorders in this sample is considerably
higher than the 29-38% lifetime prevalence rate of one or more of fifteen
psychiatric disorders reported in the findings of the Epidemiologic Catchment
Area project. a survey assessing. the prevalence of mental disorders in the
general population (Robins et ale 1984).
Only two (22%) of the nine subjects with a pre-disaster psychiatric
diagnosis met criteria for a diagnosis after the disaster (Table 8).

The
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other two subjects with a'post-disaster diagnosis had no prior history of
symptoms consistent with a psychiatric diagnosis.

Thus, post-disaster

disorders appeared as frequently in subjects with prior psychopathology as
they did in sUbjects without.
Prior to the disaster, three individuals (17%) had received psychiatric
treatment, and these three individuals were allan-site subjects.
these had required hospitalization.

One of

Only one individual, in the on-site

group, was receiving psychiatric care after the disaster (Table 9).
Almost two-thirds of the on-site victims took advantage of the group or
individual counseling offered after the murders, while less than half of the
off-site group took part.

Most of the sUbjects who received the counseling

did not meet criteria for a post-disaster psychiatric disorder.
Coping.

Victims almost universally coped by turning to family or friends

for support, especially in the on-site group (Table 10).

One-third received

additional support from a doctor or counselor, especially in the on-site
group, in which almost half sought this kind of assistance.

Very few

dependended on medication or alcohol to help them cope, and all those who did
were under the care of a doctor or counselor.
CONCLUSIONS
The event of the Russellville mass murders was marked by considerable
horror and terror, elements thought to be associated with high degrees of
upset in survivors.

In a sense, it was a particular shock to the historically

peaceful community in which it occurred, since events of this nature are
almost anachronistic to small close-knit communities like Russellville in
rural, alcohol-prohibiting, "Bible ' belt" settings.

The anachronistic nature

of the shootings in this town coupled with the total unexpectedness of the
event, may have served to diminish the impact of the horror and terror of the
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immediate disaster experience.

In fact, the victims frequently reported

thinking it wasn't real or it was a joke until it was over.

Oddly, many of

these sUbjects were the same ones reporting persistent symptoms of jumpiness,
hypervigilence, and

p~rsistent

dreams or recollections.

Further, reports of

PTSD symptoms occurred in a dose-response relationship to the degree of
exposure to the disaster, being far more common in on-site victims than in
those off-site.
An important element that was absent with this disaster was that of
secondary complications.

This event did not result in loss of jobs or homes,

or death of close family members for the survivors.

Also, the small community

rallied immediately to provide support for the victims, which may have further
reduced the impact of the dlsaster.
In general, the on-site victims felt more upset and less recovered than
the off-site group; which generally described themselves as recovered.

Post~

disaster psychiatric disorders appeared to show a dose-response relationship
to the degree of exposure to the disaster, but when only incident cases were
considered, this dose response relationship vanished.

It turned out that

almost three-quarters of on-site subjects had a pre-disaster history of
psychiatric illness, and none of the off-site sUbjects had such a history.
Thus, the on-site and off-site victims differed from the start on a variable
known to correlate with post-disaster adjustment.
Finally, this disaster represented a willful human act, and considerable
emotion was visible throughout the community regarding the disposition of the
gunman.

From this single event, it is not possible to tease out which of the

above characteristics of this particular disaster contribute to the various
human responses to it.

Comparison of data with that from other kinds of

disasters in other settings may help clarify these issues.

Within this
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sample, numbers are too small to make statistical comparisons of responses
between the on-site and off-site groups.

Addition of data from other

disasters may help provide the power to sort out how much the actual
experience of the disaster event contributes to outcome, versus the
contribution of secondary

co~sequences

of the event.

Tab le l. Demographics

Sex
Male
Female

On-site
(N=11)

Off-site
(N=?)

All
(N=18)

5 (45%)
6 (55%)

5 (71%)
2 (29%)

10 (56%)
8 (44%)

11 (100%)
0

7 (100%)
0

18 (100%)
0

2 (18%)
9 (81%)
0
33.4

1 (14%)
4 (36%)
1 (14%)
1 (14%)
44.3

3 (17%)
13 (72%)
1 (6%)
1 (6%)
37.6

7 (64%)
3 (27%)

5 (71%)
1 (14%)

12 (67%)
4 (22%)

1 (9%)
0

0
1 (14%)

1 (6%)
1 (6%)

11 (100%)
9 (81%)
13.7

10 (91%)
4 (57%)
13.1

17 (94%)
13 (72%)
13.5

Race
White
Black
Age groups
<25
25-44
45-64
> 64
Mean age (years)

Marital Status
Married
Divorced/
Separated
Single
Widowed
Education
HS grad or GED
Some college
Mean (Years)

Table 2.

Perceived upset, harm, and degree of recovery

On-site
(N=l1)

Off-site
(N=7) .

All
(N=18)

Upset
Very
Somewhat
Not very
No info.

a
a

4 (57%)
3 (43%)

a

13 (72%)
5 (28%)

4 (36%)
7 (64%)

a

7 (100%)

4 (22%)
14 (78%)

7 (100%)

10 (56%)
8 (44%)

9 (81%)
2 (18%)

a

Harm
Great deal
Not much
Recovery
Full
Partial
None

3 (27%)
8 (73%)

a

a
a

a

Table 3. Subjects with one or more psychiatric diagnoses *
after the disaster (prevalence versus incidence)

Subjects with
one or mote
diagnosis

On-Site
(N=1?)

Off-Site
(N=12)

All
(N=46)

All cases after
disaster
(prevalence)

3 (27%)

1 (14%)

4 (22%)

1 (9%)

1 (14%)

2 (11%)

New cases
since disaster
(incidence)

* Includes PTSD (by DSM-III criteria), alcohol abuse/dependence, depression,
and generalized anxiety disorder.

Table 4.
On-site
(N=l1)

PTSD Symptoms
Off-site
(N=?)

All
(N=18)

PTSD Symptom
dreams/
recollection

5 (45%)

2 (29%)

7 (39%)

happening again

1 (9%)

1 (6%)

numbness

2 (18%)

jumpy

8 (73%)

a
a
a

8 (44%)

insomnia

6 (55%)

2 (29%)

8 (44%)

survivor gUilt

a

a

concentration

5 (45%)

avoid reminders

2 (18%)

a
a
a

reminders make
worse

4 (36%)

1 (14%)

5 (28%)

mean number
of symptoms

3.00

0.71

2.11

SUbjects with
1 symptom

9 (81%)

2 (29%)

>

2 (11%)

5 (28%)
2 (11%)

11 (61%)

Table 5.

Post-disaster rates of PTSD diagnosis by DSM-III
versus DSM-IIIR criteria

Rates of
PTSD Diagnosis

On-site

Off-site

(N=l1)

(N=7)

By DSM-III
cri-teri a

2 (18%)

By DSM-IIIR
criteria

·0

All
(N=18)

a

2 (11%)

a

a

Table 6.

Rates of Psychiatric Diagnosis

All cases since disaster (Prevalence)
Diagnosis

On-site
(N=l1)

PTSD*

2

Alcohol abuse/
dependence

a

Depression

2

Generalized
anxiety disorder

a

(18%)

(18%)

Off-site
(N=?)

All
(N=18)

a
a

a

1 (14%)

3 (17%)

a

a

2

(11%)

New Cases Since Disaster (Incidence)
On-site
(N=l1)

Off-site
(N=7)

All
(N=18)

PTSD*

2 (18%)

a

2

Alcohol abuse/
dependence

a

o.

a

Depression

1 (9%)

1 (14%)

2

Generalized
anxiety disorder

a

a

a

(11%)

(11%)

Diagnosis Present Before and After Disaster
(Persistence)
On-site
(N=l1)

Off-site
(N=7)

All
(N=18)

a
a

a
a

a

Depression

1 (9%)

1 (6%)

Generalized
anxiety disorder

a

a
a

PTSD*
Alcohol abuse/
dependence

*Diagnosis made by DSM-III criteria.

0(9%)

a

